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There is no doubt that for the Trump administration, immigration 
enforcement and mass deportation are at the top of the agenda.1 Even 
before taking office on January 20, 2017, United States President 
Donald Trump (“President Trump”) vowed to deport all immigrants 
with serious criminal records—the “bad hombres.”2 His 
administration, however, has deported more than just Mexican 
“criminals, drug dealers, and rapists.”3 Deportation, prolonged 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science and Spanish, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2010. A special thank you to my family, friends, and professors for their 
continuous support in my academic endeavors. 
1 Even as a presidential candidate, President Trump promised to deport over 
two million unauthorized immigrants which he argued had “committed crimes.” 
Allissa Wickham, Trump's Plan to Deport 2M Immigrants Will Face Roadblocks, 
LAW360, Nov. 16, 2016. 
2 Id.; Kevin Penton, Even ‘Good Hombres’ Not Safe from Removal: 9th Circ. 
Judge, LAW360, May 30, 2017. 
3 See Penton, supra note 2; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False 
Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime, THE WASH. POST, Jul. 8, 
1
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detentions, denaturalization and family separation are but a few of the 
challenges faced by the immigrant community in the Trump Era.4 The 
Department of Justice, under President Trump, has aggressively 
enforced federal immigration laws, invoking great fear in immigrant 
communities across the nation.5  
In response to this hardline position on immigration enforcement, 
several jurisdictions throughout the United States declared themselves 
“sanctuaries,” or reaffirmed their already in-place sanctuary status.6 
Sanctuary jurisdictions in the United States are not a new concept, 
they trace back to the 1980s.7 They originally emerged to protect 
refugees with legitimate claims to asylum from federal immigration 
enforcement.8 Today’s sanctuary jurisdictions limit the enforcement of 
federal immigration laws against all immigrants with strong ties to the 
community that have no serious criminal record. 9 Sanctuary policies, 
however, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.10 
When a United States citizen is pulled over for a broken tail light, 
they do not expect their lives to be significantly turned around.11 On 
                                                                                                                   
2015; Brian Bennett, Not Just ‘Bad Hombres’: Trump is Targeting up to 8 Million 
People for Deportation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017. 
4 In 2017, ICE arrested 37,670 individuals without criminal record by October, 
a 125% increase from the prior year. Amanda Holpuch, I Live in Fear: Under 
Trump, Life for America’s Immigrants Can Change in a Flash, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 
18, 2018. 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., Kore Rumore, Chicago’s History as a Sanctuary City, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 13, 2017; Jazmine Ulloa, California Becomes ‘Sanctuary State’ in Rebuke of 
Trump Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2017. 
7 Elizabeth M. McCormik, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to 
Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 165, 173-74 (2016). 
8 Id. 
9 See Id.; see also, e.g., Ulloa, supra note 6. 
10 See Rumore, supra note 6. For the City of Chicago being a sanctuary means 
providing a safe home to all Chicagoans, regardless of his or her immigration status. 
Chicago’s sanctuary policy is a “commitment to inclusion.” Id. 
11 See Tamara Lyte, Increased Enforcement Threatens Undocumented 
Immigrants, USA TODAY’S HISPANIC LIVING MAGAZINE, Sep. 23, 2017. 
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the other hand, for an undocumented immigrant, this same situation 
can be detrimental to his or her future.12 If they do not have a valid 
driver’s license, they will be arrested and can be turned over to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for deportation, even 
if they have no serious criminal record.13 Many times, this results in 
prolonged detention periods by the local law enforcement, which 
violates the individual’s due process rights.14 In 2012, Chicago Mayor 
Emmanuel signed the “Welcoming City Ordinance” that ensured 
undocumented immigrants are not arrested solely because of their 
immigration status.15  
Sanctuary policies such as the Welcoming City Ordinance of 
Chicago threaten President Trump’s immigration enforcement 
agenda,16 making them a target of his administration.17 On January 25, 
2017, only five days after his inauguration, President Trump issued an 
executive order requiring former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
(“Attorney General Sessions”) to ensure sanctuary jurisdictions were 
not eligible to receive certain federal funding.18 It was an effort to 
force sanctuary jurisdictions to cooperate in the enforcement of federal 
immigration laws.19 This order, however was challenged in a federal 
court in California where it was permanently enjoined.20  
Despite these failed efforts, in July 2017 Attorney General 
Sessions continued to threaten to withhold federal funding from 
sanctuary jurisdictions that failed to cooperate in the enforcement of 
                                                 
12 See Id. 
13 See Id. 
14 See Id. 
15 Rumore, supra note 4. 
16 See Wickham, supra note 1. 
17 See Rumore, supra note 6. 
18 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc 
granted in part, vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. 2018) 




Sandoval Vargas: Sanctuary Jurisdictions: In a System of Checks and Balances Who H
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018




federal immigration laws.21 He added three new conditions to the 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne Grant”).22 
That grant provides state and local law enforcement agencies with 
substantial funds for personnel, equipment, training and other 
expenses.23 To continue to receive the Byrne Grant, Chicago and other 
state and local jurisdictions were required to: (1) give immigration 
agents unrestricted access to police stations; (2) give immigrations 
agents at least forty-eight hour notice before a detainee was released;24 
and (3) comply with a federal statute that encourages information 
sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration 
agents.25  
Chicago, like other jurisdictions, did not give up its sanctuary 
policies.26 Mayor Emmanuel said, “We will never be coerced or 
intimidated into abandoning our values as a welcoming city.”27 
Instead, Chicago was the first to file a lawsuit against the Department 
of Justice challenging these new conditions to the Byrne Grant,28 
arguing that the conditions were unconstitutional.29  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois agreed with Chicago that the Executive Branch had 
overstepped the authority granted to them by the United States 
Constitution.30 On September 15, 2017, the district court granted in 
part Chicago’s motion for preliminary injunction.31 The court held that 
                                                 
21 Id. at 276-77.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 276-280; City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 
2017). 
24 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77. 
25 City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
26 Rumore, supra note 4.  
27 Dianna Novak Jones, Immigration Info Law Unconstitutional in Sanctuary 
City Row, LAW360, July 27, 2017. 
28 Id. 
29 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77. 
30 Id. 
31 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
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two of the three conditions were unconstitutional: the access and 
notice conditions.32 The district court found that Congress had not 
authorized Attorney General Sessions to impose these conditions in 
the first place.33 Attorney General Sessions appealed the preliminary 
injunction to the access and notice conditions.34 
On April 19, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit (“Seventh Circuit”) affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.35 In reviewing the decision, the Seventh Circuit underlined 
that the issue before it was separation of powers and not immigration 
policy.36 The Seventh Circuit found that the Executive Branch’s 
actions were an “usurpation of power” because there was no 
congressional authorization for its actions and there was evidence that 
Congress repeatedly refused to impose conditions that tied funding to 
immigration policies.37 Judge Rovner said: “We are a country that 
jealously guards the separation of powers, and we must be ever-
vigilant in that endeavor.”38 
The three-judge panel agreed that the notice and access conditions 
imposed by the Attorney General Sessions were unconstitutional as 
lacking congressional authorization.39 Judge Manion, however, 
disagreed that the injunction should be applied nationally, and instead 
believed the injunction should be limited to Chicago.40 He argued that 
imposing a nationwide injunction on these issues was beyond the 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 951. 
34 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77. 
35 Id. at 293. 




40 Id. at 295 (Manion, J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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scope of the Seventh Circuit.41 He believed that national injunctions 
should only be applied when “absolutely necessary.”42  
Attorney General Sessions appealed the scope of the injunction, 
and asked the Seventh Circuit to limit the injunction to Chicago.43 In 
June 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted the Attorney General’s request 
to limit the preliminary injunction.44 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
did not address the issue of whether courts have the power to grant 
nationwide injunctions.45  
This article will examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in City of 
Chicago v. Sessions in the context of two core principles of this nation, 
separation of powers and federalism. This article argues that the 
Seventh Circuit correctly decided that the notice and access conditions 
to the Byrne Grant were beyond the scope of power of the Executive 
Branch. Furthermore, this article argues that if the Seventh Circuit had 
reviewed the lower court’s decision on the third condition, it would 
have found the third condition unconstitutional, as the district court 
later did in issuing a permanent injunction against all three conditions.  
Part I of the article examines the history of sanctuary jurisdictions 
and the principles of separation of powers and federalism. Part II of 
the article examines the decision in City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
arguing that the Seventh Circuit correctly decided that the access and 
notice conditions to the Byrne Grant were unconstitutional. Part II also 
reviews the decisions of other courts regarding the conditions placed 
on the Byrne Grant by Attorney General Sessions and the executive 
order issued by President Trump trying to withhold federal funding 
from sanctuary jurisdictions. Part III looks at the how different courts 
decided and reviewed the third condition to the Byrne Grant. Finally, 
Part III discusses how the Seventh Circuit should have decided on the 
third condition had it been raised on appeal.  
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 300. 
43 City of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21801, at *3-4 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/8





A.  Background: Sanctuaries, separation of powers, and federalism in 
the Trump Era. 
 
1.  The History of Sanctuary Jurisdictions. 
 
Sanctuary jurisdictions are not a new concept; they trace back  
to the 1980s.46 The first sanctuary jurisdictions declared themselves 
sanctuaries to protect refugees with legitimate claims to asylum from 
federal immigration enforcement.47  Since then, sanctuary jurisdictions 
have emerged to protect immigrant communities across the nation.48 
However, sanctuary jurisdictions today differ in that they go beyond 
protecting refugees.49 Generally, sanctuary jurisdictions today declare 
themselves sanctuaries to demonstrate they stand in solidarity with the 
immigrant communities within their jurisdiction.50 There is no one 
definition for sanctuary jurisdictions, but one thing has held true of 
sanctuary jurisdictions throughout time: they limit the enforcement of 
federal immigration laws against non-criminal immigrants with strong 
ties to the community.51  
In the Trump Era, immigrant communities throughout the United 
States have been under constant attack.52 President Trump has kept his 
candidacy promises of: (1) mass deportation; (2) removal of Obama 
immigrant-friendly policies; and (3) extend the wall at the border of 
Mexico and the United States.53 In his first few weeks in office, 
President Trump issued anti-immigrant policies, including the initial 
                                                 
46 McCormik, supra note 5, at 173-74. 
47 Id. 
48 Marco J. Crocetti, Leon Fresco, and Marissa C. Serafino, Analyzing the 




52 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the Trump 
Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 611, 628-30 (2017). 
53 Id. 
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travel ban, which became known to many as the “Muslim ban.”54 
These and other polices by his administration invoked great fear in 
immigrant communities throughout the United States, including 
policies that separate children from their parents.55  
In response to these xenophobic policies, several jurisdictions 
throughout the United States declared themselves sanctuary cities or 
reaffirmed their sanctuary status.56 Because sanctuary jurisdictions 
limit the enforcement of federal immigration laws, they too have 
become a target of the Trump administration and have not been spared 
from scrutiny in President Trump’s tweets.57 President Trump has 
taken active steps to keep his campaign promise to block funding to 
sanctuary jurisdictions.58   
 
a.  Congress’ response to sanctuary jurisdictions: The two statutes. 
 
The Trump administration is not the first branch of government  
to try to overcome sanctuary jurisdictions’ unwillingness to enforce 
federal immigration laws.59 In 1996, Congress enacted two statutes, § 
1644 and § 1373, in response to a rise in sanctuary jurisdictions.60 
Both statutes were created to facilitate information sharing between 
the federal government and the state and local governments on issues 
                                                 
54 Id. at 630. Trump signed the initial travel ban, which suspended the 
admission of all refugees and of individuals from seven predominantly Muslim 
countries, days after being inaugurated. Id. 
55 Over two thousand migrant children were separated from their parents when 
they were apprehended by immigrant officials at the border in 2018. David S. 
Rubenstein, Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 178 (2018). 
56 See Rumore, supra note 4. On November 13, 2016, Chicago Mayor Ram 
Emmanuel, reaffirmed Chicago’s stance as a “Welcoming City.” 
57 Alyssa Garcia, Much Ado About Nothing?: Local Resistance and the 
Significance of Sanctuary Laws, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2018). 
58 Id. 
59 McCormick, supra note 5, at 174-76. 
60 Id. 
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of immigration.61 Congress’ intent, however, was to encourage but not 
require this type of communication.62 
Section 1644 prohibited state and local governments from 
restricting information sharing that would help the federal government 
enforce federal immigration laws.63 While section 1373, encouraged 
state and local governments to share information that would help the 
federal government with the enforcement of immigration laws and 
policies.64 Since these provisions were enacted, courts have limited 
their scope.65 These provisions were used as a tool to try to overcome 
sanctuary jurisdiction policies in court.66 Courts found that state and 
local laws requiring cooperation with federal authorities regarding the 
sharing of immigration information were not preempted by federal 
law.67 Despite the small victory, most attempts to overcome sanctuary 
jurisdictions through these provisions failed.68 The provisions were 
found to authorize the free communication between local and state 
officials and the federal authorities regarding information that could 
help enforce federal immigration laws.69 They were meant to prevent 





65 See Doe v. New York City, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that § 1373 does not impose an affirmative duty to report immigration 
information to federal authorities); Johnson v. Hurt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 840 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012) (finding that Congress’ intent in § 1373 was to create a “nationwide 
system of voluntary information sharing” to assist with federal enforcement of 
immigration laws). 
66 McCormick, supra note 5, at 194. 
67 See Fonseca v. Fong, (finding that a state statute requiring local law 
enforcement to report certain individuals believed to be undocumented immigrants 
to federal authorities was not preempted by federal law).  
68 See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1415-16 (2009) (finding 
that a statute prohibiting local officials from asking an individual’s immigration 
status for the sole purpose of learning their status was not preempted by federal law 
because it did not prohibit the communication of information to federal authorities, 
and thus was not in conflict with federal law). 
69 McCormick, supra note 5, at 199-200. 
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states from placing obstacles against this type of communication;70 
however, the provisions did not require this communication, nor did 
they permit it when other federal laws protected the information, such 
as privacy laws.71 Therefore, even after the enactment of these 
provisions, sanctuary jurisdictions continued to exist and prevail.72 If 
Congress chose not to require sanctuary jurisdictions to cooperate with 
the enforcement of federal immigration laws, can the Executive 
Branch require compliance? Does the Executive Branch have the 
power to defeat sanctuary jurisdiction’s policies? 
 
2.  A core principle: Separation of powers. 
 
Separation of powers is a core principle of this nation.73 The 
framers of the U.S. Constitution specifically built a system of checks 
and balances to prevent any one branch from becoming too 
powerful.74 Yet, since the nineteenth century, the scope of the 
Executive Branch has been greatly broadened.75 Both Democratic and 
Republican presidents alike have used the “executive pen” to issue 
executive orders that carry out their agendas, especially when dealing 
with issues of immigration.76 In fact, since President Trump took 
office in 2017, he has signed over seventy-seven executive orders, 
including multiple versions of the travel ban.77 President Trump signed 
more executive orders in his first one hundred days in office than any 
other recent president.78 To put this in perspective, consider that the 




73 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018). 
74 Id. 
75 Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders 
in a Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2-5 (2002). 
76 Id. 
77 Leada Gore, How many executive orders has President Trump signed?, 
REAL TIME NEWS FROM AL.COM, July 30, 2018. 
78 Id. 
10
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first twenty-four presidents issued 1262 executive orders 
collectively.79 This heavy use of the executive pen has raised the 
question of what is the scope of the Executive Branch?80 The Trump 
administration has been before the courts on this issue more than 
once.81 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were determined to build a 
system different than the one they escaped.82 The framers wanted to 
ensure that they did not fall under the rule of another tyrant king, so 
they created a system that ensured history would not repeat itself in the 
United States.83 First, the framers divided the power of the federal 
government into three separate branches: judicial, executive, and 
legislative.84 They tasked each branch with specific responsibilities 
and granted them specific powers to carry out those responsibilities.85 
Next, the framers created a system of checks and balances to prevent 
any one branch of the federal government from becoming too 
powerful.86 Each branch of government has ways to check the power 
of the other two branches.87  
This system of checks and balances has withstood the test of time 
and has, for the most part, functioned as the framers intended. 
Generally, the branches have operated in balance with one another. 
The power of the Executive Branch, however, has been greatly 
expanded and continues to be expanded to date. So, does the 
                                                 
79 Branum, supra note 65, at 9-10. 
80 See Id. 
81 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (2018); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 
888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018). 
82 Branum, supra note 65, at 10-12. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 15. The legislative branch would create the law, the Executive Branch 
would enforce the law, and the judicial branch would interpret the law. Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. For example, the president has the power to veto a legislative bill 
presented by Congress. The judicial system can declare laws created by Congress or 
actions taken by the President unconstitutional. In turn, the President checks the 
courts by through his power to appoint judges. 
11
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Executive Branch have the power to condition federal funding to 
compel states to comply with the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws? If so, who or what gives the Executive Branch that power? This 
is exactly the issue that was brought before the Seventh Circuit in City 
of Chicago v. Sessions, but before reviewing the court’s decision in 
that case, it is important we discuss another fundamental principal of 
United States law, federalism. Can the federal government coerce 
states to enforce federal laws? 
 
3.  Federalism. 
 
There is no doubt that federalism places a limitation on 
congressional power when it threatens the sovereignty of the states.88 
In New York v. United States89 and Printz v. United States90, the 
Supreme Court held that the federal government could not compel 
states to enforce federal laws. In 1996, however, the Second Circuit 
distinguished the two anti-sanctuary federal statutes from both cases.91 
The court found that Congress had not forced state and local 
governments to enact or enforce federal regulatory programs.92 Does 
federalism prevent the Executive Branch from conditioning federal 
funds to compel state and local governments to enforce federal 
immigration laws? If the Executive Branch had the authority to 
condition federal funding the way it did, would federalism protect 
sanctuary cities? 
 
B.  The Seventh Circuit’s review of City of Chicago v. Sessions. 
 
Chicago has been a sanctuary jurisdiction since 1982, when 
several Chicago churches harbored refugees protecting them from 
                                                 
88 Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO.  L. REV. 389, 389-391 
(2003). 
89 505 U.S. 144, 212 (1992).  
90 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997). 
91 McCormick, supra note 5, at 185-86. 
92 Id. 
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enforcement of federal immigration laws.93 In 2006, Chicago codified 
its sanctuary city policies with the enactment of its welcoming 
ordinance.94 That same year the federal government established the 
Byrne Grant, which provides state and local law enforcement 
substantial funds for criminal justice expenses.95 For years, Chicago 
received federal funding through the Byrne Grant without any issues.96  
Over the years, several bills have been introduced in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate attempting to condition federal grants 
in a way that would coerce states and local governments to cooperate 
with the enforcement of federal immigration laws; however, none of 
these bills have become law.97 On January 25, 2017, President Trump 
issued an executive order requiring Attorney General Sessions to 
ensure that sanctuary jurisdictions were no longer eligible to receive 
certain federal funding, including the Byrne Grant.98 This order was 
challenged in a federal court in California where it was permanently 
enjoined.99  
After President Trump’s order was enjoined, Attorney General 
Sessions directly issued three conditions to the Byrne Grant, again 
attempting to coerce states and local governments to comply with the 
enforcement of federal immigration laws.100 The three conditions 
were: notice, access, and compliance.101 The notice condition required 
local law enforcement to notify federal agents in advance when they 
scheduled the release of individuals suspected to be in violation of 
federal immigration laws.102 The access condition required local law 
                                                 
93 Rumore, supra note 4. 
94 See CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 et seq. (2007).  
95 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018); City of Chi. 
v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 






102 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
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enforcement to give federal agents access to its detention facilities and 
detained individuals.103 The final condition required local law 
enforcement to comply with federal statute § 1373, which prevents 
local and state governments from restricting information sharing 
between local law enforcement and federal immigration agents.104 
Chicago challenged all three conditions to the Byrne Grant in 
federal district court, because these conditions directly conflicted with 
its sanctuary policies.105 Chicago argued that these conditions were 
unconstitutional and asked the district court to issue a preliminary 
injunction for all three conditions.106 The district court agreed with 
Chicago that the notice and access conditions were unlawful and 
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction for those conditions.107 The 
court held that Attorney General Sessions had no authority to issue 
those conditions, and that any efforts to impose the conditions violated 
the separation of powers and were ultra vires.108 The district court, 
however, did not grant a preliminary injunction for the compliance 
condition.109  
This case was brought before the Seventh Circuit, on appeal by 
Attorney General Sessions for the notice and access conditions.110 The 
third condition was not reviewed by the Seventh Circuit.111 Attorney 
General Sessions argued that the lower court’s decision was wrong 
because he had statutory authority to impose the access and notice 
conditions.112 He said that his authority for his actions came from a 
statute defining the duties and functions of the Attorney General.113 He 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 936. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282 (7th Cir. 2007). 
109 City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 936. 
110 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-80. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 282-84. 
113 Id. 
14
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specifically pointed to a section of the statute that reads, “[t]he 
Attorney General shall exercise such powers and functions . . . , 
including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining 
priority purposes for formula grants.”114 The Seventh Circuit said 
Attorney General Sessions’ interpretation of this statute was contrary 
to Congress’ intent.115 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that this 
section of the statute would be an odd place for Congress to grant such 
a power.116  
The Seventh Circuit stressed that the issue before them was one of 
separation of powers and not immigration policies.117 In reviewing 
whether the Executive Branch had the power to withhold federal 
funding from sanctuary jurisdictions, the Court first turned to the U.S. 
Constitution, which exclusively provides that the power of the purse 
belongs to Congress.118 The Attorney General, however, did not 
contend that the Executive Branch has inherent power to condition 
grants.119 Instead, Attorney General Sessions argued that his power to 
condition federal funding originated with Congress, but was delegated 
to him.120 The Seventh Circuit agreed that Congress can delegate 
certain powers to the Executive Branch, but disagreed with the 
Attorney General that Congress did so in this situation.121  
To determine whether the Executive Branch overstepped its 
power, the Court analyzed whether Congress delegated the power to 
condition the federal funding in question to the Executive Branch.122 
First, the Court looked to the statute, to determine if there was an 
explicit grant of power from Congress.123 The statute does not 
                                                 
114 Id. at 284 (quoting 34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6) (West 2017)). 
115 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-80. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 277. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 283. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 286. 
122 Id. at 283-86. 
123 Id. 
15
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explicitly grant the Executive Branch the power to withhold federal 
funding for the Byrne Grant.124 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged 
that the statute granted Attorney General Sessions with some powers 
typically reserved for Congress, but the Court concluded that none of 
the provisions in the statute gave him the authority to impose such 
conditions on federal funding.125  
The Seventh Circuit also addressed this issue from a separation of 
powers stand point.126 The Court was concerned that if the Executive 
Branch could not only determine policy, but also enforce it, then there 
would be no check against tyranny – the very reason our founders 
even created a system with separation of powers.127 Judge Rovner 
said, “[i]t falls to us, the judiciary, as the remaining branch of 
government, to act as a check on such usurpation of power.”128  
 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s review of City & County of San 
Francisco v. Trump 
 
The Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, found that the 
Executive Branch violated the separation of powers principle, “an 
integral part of the Founder’s design.”129 However, the court reached 
this determination on a slightly different matter.130 Instead of 
reviewing the conditions placed on the Byrne Grant by Attorney 
General Sessions, the Ninth Circuit reviewed President Trump’s 
Executive Order 13,768, signed on January 25, 2017.131 Like Attorney 
General Sessions conditions on the Byrne Grant this executive order 
was intended to withhold federal funding from sanctuary 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 277. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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jurisdictions.132 The executive order required the Attorney General to 
ensure that any jurisdiction that refused to comply with 8 U.S.C § 
1373 was not eligible to receive federal grants.133 The Ninth Circuit 
found that President Trump’s executive order “direct[ed] the agencies 
of the Executive Branch to withhold funds appropriated by Congress 
in order to further the Administration's policy objective of 
punishing cities and counties that adopt so-called ‘sanctuary’ 
policies.”134 
 The Ninth Circuit conducted a similar analysis to the Seventh 
Circuit in reaching its decision.135 The President’s power “must stem 
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”136 The 
court looked first to the U.S. Constitution to determine who has the 
power to condition federal grants.137 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that 
the power of the purse is an “exclusive congressional power.”138 The 
court found that the President’s “power [was] at its lowest ebb” here 
because Congress had not delegated to the President the power to 
condition new federal grants with compliance of 8 U.S.C § 1373.139 
The Ninth Circuit stressed that the Trump administration “ha[d] not 
even attempted to show that Congress authorized it to withdraw 
federal grant[s]” from sanctuary jurisdictions.140 Furthermore, the 
court pointed out that Congress had repeatedly rejected legislation that 
aligned with the goals of President Trump’s order.141 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1233. 
135 Id. at 1232-35. 
136 Id. at 1233 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 585(1952)) (internal quotations omitted). 
137 City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1232-35. 
138 Id. at 1231. 
139 Id. at 1233-34 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 637 (1952)) (internal quotations omitted). 
140 City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1234. 
141 Id. 
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found that the Executive Branch had “claimed for itself Congress's 
exclusive spending power.”142 
  Without congressional authorization, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Executive Branch could not refuse to issue federal grants to 
sanctuary cities.143 Therefore, on August 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision in part.144 The Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case only for the reconsideration of the scope of the 
injunction.145  
 While the Ninth Circuit reviewed a slightly different matter, its 
decision focused on the same core principle of separation of powers. 
Both cases dealt with the Executive Branch, under President Trump, 
attempting to withhold federal funding from jurisdictions that did not 
help enforce federal immigration laws. One court reviewed the 
Attorney General’s actions in reaching this goal, while the other 
reviewed the President’s similar actions. What is important is that both 
courts reached the conclusion that Congress controls federal spending, 
and not the Executive Branch, and that Congress has not delegated that 
power to the Executive Branch. 146 The Ninth Circuit also agreed with 
the Seventh Circuit that the Executive Branch could only withhold 
federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions if it had congressional 
authorization.147 Therefore, finding Executive Order 13,768 
unconstitutional.148 Additionally, two other district courts have found 
against the Executive Branch on similar issues for the same reason: the 
power of the purse belongs to Congress and Congress has not 
delegated that authority to the Executive Branch.149 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has yet to weigh in on this issue. 
                                                 
142 Id. 




147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 See City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
173376, at *26-27 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (finding President Trump’s order 
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C.  The third condition: Compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
 
In 1996, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C § 1373, a statute that 
encouraged communication between state and local governments and 
the federal government regarding individual’s immigration status.150 
The statute was meant to facilitate information sharing between the 
federal government and the state and local governments on issues of 
immigration.151 Congress’ intent, however, was not to require such 
communication.152 Section 1373 simply encouraged state and local 
governments to share information that would help the federal 
government with their efforts of enforcing immigration laws and 
policies.153 Nonetheless, this statute was used as a tool to try to 
overcome sanctuary jurisdiction policies in court.154 But most attempts 
to overcome sanctuary jurisdictions through this statute failed.155 
Courts found the statute to authorize the free communication between 
local and state officials and the federal authorities regarding 
information that could help enforce federal immigration laws.156 They 
were meant to prevent states from placing obstacles against this type 
                                                                                                                   
conditioning funding to sanctuary cities unconstitutional); City of Phila. v. Sessions, 
309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 344 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding the three conditions imposed by 






154 McCormick, supra note 5, at 194. 
155 See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1415-16 (2009) (finding that a 
statute prohibiting local officials from asking an individual’s immigration status for 
the sole purpose of learning their status was not preempted by federal law because it 
did not prohibit the communication of information to federal authorities, and thus 
was not in conflict with federal law). 
156 McCormick, supra note 5, at 199-200. 
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of communication;157 however, the provisions do not require this 
communication.158 
On January 25, 2017, only five days after his inauguration, 
President Trump issued an executive order requiring the Attorney 
General to ensure that any jurisdiction that refused to comply with 8 
U.S.C § 1373 was not eligible to receive federal grants.159 This order 
was challenged in a federal court in California where it was 
permanently enjoined.160 The Ninth Circuit held that the executive 
order violated the separation of powers principle.161 The Ninth Circuit 
said that the Executive Branch could not refuse to issue federal grants 
to sanctuary cities without congressional authorization.162 
In July 2017 Attorney General Sessions threatened that federal 
funding to sanctuary jurisdictions would be withheld if those 
jurisdictions failed to cooperate in the enforcement of federal 
immigration laws.163 He added three new conditions to the Byrne 
Grant: notice, access, and compliance.164 The third condition required 
local and state jurisdictions to comply with federal statute § 1373 that 
encourages information sharing between local law enforcement and 
federal immigration agents.165  
On September 15, 2017, a district court found that the three new 
conditions of access and notice were unconstitutional.166 The district 
court applied a preliminary nationwide injunction on those conditions, 
but not the third condition.167  




160 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018). 
161 City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2018). 
162 Id. at 1231. 
163 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-77 (7th Cir. 2018). 
164 Id. 
165 City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 951. 
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Attorney General Sessions appealed the preliminary injunction to 
the access and notice conditions.168 The Seventh Circuit, however, did 
not review the constitutionality of the third condition.169 If the Seventh 
Circuit had reviewed the third condition it would have found that 
condition unconstitutional for the same reason it found the other two 
conditions unconstitutional. First, the power of the purse exclusively 
belongs to Congress. Second, Congress has not delegated this power to 
the Executive Branch. When issuing the preliminary injunction, the 
district court did not find there was sufficient evidence at that time to 
find the third condition unconstitutional. The court had a more difficult 
time finding that condition unconstitutional because the condition is 
based on a statute. However, when deciding whether to grant the 
permanent injunction the district court found that the third condition 
was also unconstitutional on the same grounds it found the other 
conditions unconstitutional. For those reason, the district court granted 
the permanent injunction against all three conditions, including the 
condition of compliance. Similarly, other district courts have found the 




During President Trump’s campaign, he vowed to deport all 
immigrants with serious criminal records, but his administration has 
deported more than just the “Mexican drug dealers, criminals, and 
rapist.” The Trump administration has taken an aggressive stance in 
enforcing federal immigration laws, and to advance this hardline 
position on immigration enforcement, President Trump issued an 
executive order conditioning federal funding trying to force sanctuary 
jurisdictions to cooperate in the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws. When the order was enjoined by a federal court in California, 
former Attorney General Sessions placed three conditions on the 
Federal Byrne Grant, requiring jurisdictions to comply with federal 
immigration enforcement laws. 
                                                 
168 City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77. 
169 See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-77 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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Separation of powers is a core principle of this nation. The 
framers of the U.S. Constitution specifically built a system of checks 
and balances to ensure that no branch would become too powerful. 
Yet, since the nineteenth century, the scope of the Executive Branch 
has been greatly broadened. In recent years, that scope has broadened 
further through the President’s use of executive orders. The scope of 
the Executive Branch’s power has repeatedly been a question before 
the courts under the Trump administration, especially in terms of 
immigration policies. Does the U.S Constitution grant the Executive 
Branch the power to withhold federal funding from jurisdictions that 
do not enforce federal immigration laws? If not, who gave the 
Executive Branch that authority?  
The U.S. Constitution leaves no doubt that the power of the purse 
belongs to Congress and not the Executive Branch. While Congress 
can, it has not authorized the Executive Branch to condition federal 
grants in this manner. In fact, Congress has repeatedly refused 
legislation that ties federal funding to immigration laws, including 
legislation proposed by the 115th Congress. Plain and simple, 
President Trump’s executive order and Attorney General Sessions’ 
conditions to the Byrne Grant, violated the U.S. Constitution’s 
principle of separation of powers. Multiple federal courts have found 
President Trump’s order and Attorney General Sessions’ conditions to 
federal funding at least partially unconstitutional on this ground. The 
Seventh Circuit in City of Chicago v. Sessions, found two of Attorney 
General Sessions’ conditions to the Byrne Grant unconstitutional. The 
Seventh Circuit described the Executive Branch’s actions as a 
“usurpation of power.”170 Judge Rovner stressed: “We are a country 
that jealously guards the separation of powers, and we must be ever-
vigilant in that endeavor.”171 
I could not agree more with the Seventh Circuit: no one branch 
should have all that power. The Executive Branch tried to resolve a 
broken immigration system with a stroke of pen, but pushing 
xenophobic policies is not the answer. And, the Executive Branch 
                                                 
170 City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018). 
171 Id. 
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cannot expect state and local governments to want to enforce such 
extreme, harsh policies, policies that rip young children out their 
parent’s arms. A broken immigration system will not be resolved 
overnight, much less by a single executive order. Violating the core 
principles of separation of powers and federalism are not the solution. 
Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to resolve this 
issue, but this issue will never be fixed if our government continues 
acting based on party lines. If the federal government wants state and 
local governments to enforce federal law, the branches must work 





Sandoval Vargas: Sanctuary Jurisdictions: In a System of Checks and Balances Who H
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018
